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Occupational guilds have been observed for thousands of years in many 
economies: ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome; medieval and early modern India, 
Japan, Persia, Byzantium and Europe; and nineteenth-century China, Latin America, 
and the Ottoman Empire. Guilds were most prevalent in manufacturing. Almost all 
urban craftsmen were guilded and, in parts of central and southern Europe, many rural 
artisans as well. But the service sector also had many guilds. Nearly all pre-modern 
economies had guilds of merchants and retailers, and some also had guilds of painters, 
musicians, physicians, prostitutes, or chimney-sweeps. Guilds were rarest in primary 
production, but some places had guilds of farmers, gardeners, wine-growers, 
shepherds, miners, or fishermen.1  
Although guilds have existed for millennia in economies across the world, 
the analysis of guilds as economic institutions is largely based on Europe between 
about 1000 and about 1800. This is partly because empirical findings on guilds are 
richest there, and partly because guilds showed interesting variation across Europe, 
gradually weakening after 1500 in some societies but surviving long past 1800 in 
others. Most significantly, Europe is where sustained economic growth first arose, 
raising obvious questions about the relationship between guilds and growth. For these 
reasons, this paper also focuses on guilds in Europe since the later Middle Ages.  
Guilds in medieval and early modern Europe offered an effective 
institutional mechanism whereby two powerful groups, guild members and political 
elites, could collaborate in capturing a larger slice of the economic pie and 
                                                     
1 A guild is an association formed by people who share certain 
characteristics and wish to pursue mutual purposes. Historically, guilds have included 
religious fraternities for common worship and insurance, foreigners’ guilds to 
represent migrants and visitors from the same place of origin, neighbourhood guilds 
for local improvements and sociability, and militia guilds for public order and 
emergencies. The vast majority of guilds, however, were formed around shared 
occupations, even if they also engaged in religious or social activities. 
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redistributing it to themselves at the expense of the rest of the economy. Guilds 
provided an organizational mechanism for groups of businessmen to negotiate with 
political elites for exclusive legal privileges that allowed them to reap monopoly rents. 
Guild members then used their guilds to redirect a share of these rents to political 
elites in return for support and enforcement. In short, guilds enabled their members 
and political elites to negotiate a way of extracting rents in the manufacturing and 
commercial sectors, rents that neither party could have extracted on its own.  
My assessment of guilds begins with an overview of where and when 
European guilds arose, what occupations they encompassed, how large they were, and 
how they varied across time and space. Against this background, I then examine how 
guild activities affected market competition, commercial security, contract 
enforcement, product quality, human capital, and technological innovation. In some of 
these spheres, some of the time, guilds took actions that may have helped to boost 
economic growth. However, I will argue that in each of these arenas the behavior of 
guilds can best be understood as aimed at securing rents for guild members; guilds 
then transferred a share of these rents to political elites in return for granting and 
enforcing the legal privileges that enabled guilds to engage in rent extraction. 
Debates about guilds are not just historical quibbles, but have wider 
implications for a very modern topic: the role of institutions in economic growth. The 
conclusion to this paper considers what we can learn from guilds about this question. 
Guilds, I will argue, provide strong support for the view that institutions arise and 
survive as a result of political conflicts over distribution (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2005; Ogilvie 2007b). 
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A Brief History of European Guilds 
 
Guilds existed in Europe under the ancient Roman Empire and appeared 
occasionally during the Dark Ages (c. 400 - c. 1000), but came definitively back into 
view with the resurgence of trade and industry, together with public record-keeping, 
after about 1000. They had their heyday in the later Middle Ages, from about 1000 to 
about 1500, although they survived in some societies long past 1800 (for surveys, see 
Ogilvie 2007a; Ogilvie 2011). Local guilds of wholesale merchants re-appeared in 
most European societies from the early eleventh century onwards. A bit later, as long-
distance trade expanded during the medieval Commercial Revolution, some local 
merchant guilds formed branches abroad as alien merchant guilds or “merchant 
communities” in foreign trading centres. Sometimes the merchant guilds of a group of 
towns formed a long-distance trading association called a “universitas” or a “hansa”; 
the most famous was the German Hansa, which by around 1300 encompassed 
merchant guilds from a core group of 70 north German, Dutch and Baltic cities and a 
penumbra of about 100 smaller towns (Dollinger 1970; Ogilvie 2011). Guilds of 
craftsmen re-appeared after the Dark Ages a bit later, typically from around 1100 
onwards (Epstein 1991). Some places, especially in Italy, also developed “sectoral” 
guilds combining the merchants and craftsmen of a particular industry (Caracausi 
2015). The date that different types of guild emerged (or re-emerged) varied greatly 
across Europe (although the dates are sometimes confused by accidents of what 
documents have survived). But by the thirteenth century, guilds of local traders, long-
distance merchants, and craftsmen were to be found across much of Europe. For the 
next 300-600 years, to practise industry or commerce in most European towns, it was 
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necessary to obtain a license from the relevant guild, although there were also some 
guild-free towns and enclaves (discussed below).  
Around 1500, the European guild landscape began to change. In the 
dynamic north Atlantic economies, especially England and the Low Countries 
(modern Belgium and the Netherlands), merchant guilds declined, with a proliferation 
of individual entrepreneurs who did not belong to any formal associations (Harreld 
2004; Ogilvie 2011; Gelderblom 2013). Craft guilds also began to weaken, as trade 
and industry moved to the countryside where no individual city could thoroughly 
enforce its guild regulations, because of the many other cities whose inhabitants also 
wanted to operate there (De Vries 1976; Coleman 1977; Ogilvie 1999; Davids 2008). 
Competition from guild-free rural artisans and traders in turn weakened urban guilds. 
At about this time, the greatest European trading city, Amsterdam, barred merchant 
guilds altogether; the greatest Dutch textile city, Leiden, abolished its craft guilds; 
Flanders developed huge rural industrial zones such as Hondschoote with tens of 
thousands of unguilded producers and traders.  
In England, King Henry VIII dissolved guilds during the Reformation of 
the 1530s and 1540s, because they combined religious activities with economic ones 
(and he wanted to confiscate guild property). Purely occupational guilds reappeared in 
some English towns, often by paying off the authorities. But they vanished forever in 
many others, with only one-quarter of the English guilds in existence in 1500 
surviving to 1600 (Muldrew 1993). Between 1500 and 1700, even the powerful 
London guilds (the so-called “livery companies”) gradually relinquished much 
regulation over their own members, opened up to foreigners and members of other 
occupations, lost control over the city’s guild-free enclaves and suburbs, and 
increasingly redeployed towards sociability and business networking (Kellett 1958; 
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Clark and Slack 1976; Coleman 1977; Muldrew 1993). Only about half of a sample of 
850 merchants active in late-seventeenth-century London even bothered to obtain 
municipal citizenship, which was necessary for livery-company membership, and only 
38 percent actually joined a company (Gauci 2002). In England, guilds remained 
important only in the economically stagnant “borough” towns, which quickly lost 
ground to the fast-growing industrial towns such as Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield and 
Manchester where guilds were non-existent or powerless; even in many of the old 
corporate boroughs, guilds were in decay by 1650 (Clark and Slack 1976; Coleman 
1977; Pollard 1997; Ogilvie 2005; Lis and Soly 2008). 
But England and the Low Countries were exceptional. In most other 
European societies, guilds retained economic influence into the late eighteenth or 
early nineteenth century (Ogilvie 1997; Ehmer 2008). When industry and commerce 
moved to the countryside, urban guilds did not relax their restrictions to remain 
competitive, but lobbied successfully for government protection against rural 
competitors in exchange for a share of their rents (De Vries 1976; Amelang 1986; 
Ogilvie 1999). New guilds continued to form during the eighteenth century in 
Germany, Austria, Spain, France, and even the Netherlands, whose sixteenth-century 
loosening of guild constraints gradually gave way to institutional and economic 
petrefaction after about 1670 (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997; Davids 2008; Van 
den Heuvel and Ogilvie 2013; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). Spain and Portugal even 
exported their guilds overseas, establishing powerful “consulados” which survived in 
Latin America into the nineteenth century (Woodward 2007). Many European guilds 
only broke down in the wake of the French Revolution, as France abolished its own 
guilds in 1791 and forcibly exported this institutional reform to the other European 
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countries it invaded and occupied (Kisch 1989; Horn 2006; Fitzsimmons 2010; 
Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson 2011; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie 2013). 
The number and size of guilds covered a wide spectrum. Some cities had 
many: London had 72 livery companies and 14 other occupational associations in 
1500 (Rappaport 1989); Paris had 103 guilds in 1250, 124 in 1700, and 133 in 1766 
(Saint-Léon 1922; Bourgeon 1985). But other cities had very few: Florence, one of 
the largest cities in Europe, had only 21 guilds in 1300 (Najemy 1979). Some guilds 
had only a handful of members: in seventeenth-century Paris, with half a million 
inhabitants, the metal-engravers’ guild permitted a maximum of 20 masters, the 
clockmakers a maximum of 72 (Saint-Léon 1922). Other guilds did not have a formal 
upper limit, but nonetheless restricted entry via a required career track of 
apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership with strict conditions for admission 
(discussed below). Even in Florence, with 100,000 inhabitants in 1300, each of the 21 
guilds averaged only about 350 members, ranging from 100 in the smallest to 1,600 in 
the largest (Najemy 1979). In the small German town of Fulda in 1784, with just 
8,500 inhabitants, the 21 guilds averaged only 13 members apiece, ranging from the 4 
dyers to the 60 shoemakers (Walker 1971). 
No matter how numerous or large a town’s guilds, guild members 
typically made up only a minority of inhabitants. Half the population was inherently 
excluded, since very few guilds allowed female members other than the second-class 
status permitted to masters’ widows (Wiesner 2000; Ogilvie 2003; Van den Heuvel 
2007). Even for males, guild membership usually required town “citizenship”, a 
costly privilege enjoyed by less than half the inhabitants of a typical pre-modern 
European town: in sixteenth-century London or ‘s-Hertogenbosch it was an unusually 
high 75 percent, in most other English and Dutch towns 30-50 percent, in medieval 
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Venice 5-10 percent, in other Italian cities 2-3 percent (Clark and Slack 1976; 
Rappaport 1989; Spruyt 1994; Van Zanden and Prak 2006; Ogilvie 2011).  
Most guilds also excluded Jews, bastards, migrants, laborers, farmers, 
propertiless men, former serfs and slaves, gypsies, members of other guilds, adherents 
of minority religions, men of “impure” ethnicity, and those who couldn’t afford the 
admission fees (La Force 1965; Walker 1971; Ogilvie 1997; Caracausi 2015). As one 
nineteenth-century Spaniard put it, those without funds “called in vain at the door of 
the guild, for it was opened only with a silver key” (La Force 1965, p. 92).  
Guild membership was reserved to a privileged minority, even in towns. 
At the high end lay sixteenth-century London or Augsburg, where guild masters made 
up 50-60 percent of householders and 12-13 percent of inhabitants (Rappaport 1989; 
Roper 1989). In the middle range lay Barcelona, Rouen, or Venice, with guild masters 
comprising 40-50 percent of householders and 9-10 percent of inhabitants (Amelang 
1986; Hafter 1989; Rapp 1976). But in Paris, Florence, or Turin, guild masters made 
up at most 20 percent of householders and 5 percent of inhabitants (Bourgeon 1985; 
Becker 1962; Cerutti 2010). Guilds were not all-encompassing workers’ associations, 
but exclusive organizations for middle-class businessmen. 
As such findings show, however, guilds manifested interesting variation 
across societies, cities and time-periods. This can help us assess their economic 
effects. 
 
What Did Guilds Do? 
 
Guilds engaged in multiple activities, so they provide an excellent 
demonstration of the principle that in analyzing the net economic effect of an 
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institution, it is imprudent to focus on any one of its activities in isolation (Ogilvie and 
Carus 2014; Caracausi 2015). This section considers five areas in which guilds were 
active: 1) competition and market structure; 2) security and contract enforcement; 3) 
information asymmetries and quality standards; 4) human capital investment; and 5) 
technological innovation.  
The effects of guilds in these key economic spheres have always attracted 
controversy (for surveys, see Ogilvie 2005; Epstein and Prak 2008; Ogilvie 2011). 
Contemporaries held strong views about them, with guild members (and the political 
elites they supported) extolling their virtues, while customers, employees, and 
competitors lamented their abuses. Many early economic thinkers praised guilds, as 
with the French government minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert who ordered all French 
crafts to form guilds, “so as compose by this means a group and organization of 
capable persons, and close the door to the ignorant” (Cole 1939, p. 419), or the 
Austrian imperial councillor, Johann Joachim Becher (1688, pp. 111-3), who argued 
that the authorities of old had invented the guilds because “competition weakens the 
livelihood of the community.” Others, such as Adam Smith (1776, ch. X, pt. II, p. 
152), censured guilds as “a conspiracy against the public.” Modern scholars are also 
deeply divided on guilds. Some claim that guilds were so widespread and long-lived 
that they must have been generating economic benefits. They might, for example, 
have enhanced commercial security, facilitated contract enforcement, solved 
information asymmetries between producers and consumers, overcome imperfections 
in markets for human capital, created incentives favoring technological innovation, or 
generated social capital and trust. Others argue that guilds caused inefficiencies via 
monopolies and monopsonies, rationed access to human capital investment, stifled 
innovation, engaged in costly rent-seeking, harmed outsiders such as women, Jews, 
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and the poor, and redistributed resources to their members at the expense of the wider 
economy.  
My own reading of the evidence is that a common theme underlies guilds’ 
activities: guilds tended to do what was best for guild members. In some cases, what 
guilds did brought certain benefits for the broader public. But overall, the actions 
guilds took mainly had the effect of protecting and enriching their members at the 
expense of consumers and non-members; reducing threats from innovation, 
competition, and audacious upstarts; and generating sufficient rents to pay off the 
political elites that enforced guild arrangements and might otherwise have interfered 
with them.  
 
Competition and Market Structure 
Guilds regulated market competition. Each guild possessed legal 
privileges endowing its members with exclusive rights to practice particular economic 
activities in a particular geographical area. These privileges typically consisted of a 
monopoly over producing specific goods and services, together with a monopsony 
over purchasing particular inputs. The merchant guild of a particular town secured for 
its members exclusive rights over trade in particular wares, transaction types, trade 
routes, or trading destinations. The weavers’ guild of a particular place reserved for its 
members the exclusive right to weave fabrics made of particular materials, to sell 
them to consumers or merchants, to purchase raw or semi-finished inputs such as 
wool and yarn, to employ the relevant labor including apprentices, journeymen, and 
free-lance spinners, and to use the relevant equipment such as looms, fulling-mills, 
and bleaching-fields. A guild’s exclusive privileges typically applied within a 
particular geographical area, sometimes consisting only of the town itself, often 
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reaching into its immediate circumference, and sometimes extending more widely 
across a district or province. In many regions of central, southern, and eastern Europe, 
rural artisans defended themselves against urban harassment (and sought to corner 
monopoly rents of their own) by setting up purely rural guilds or forming “regional” 
guilds alongside urban craftsmen (Ogilvie 1997; Ehmer 2008; Lis and Soly 2008). To 
establish and defend their monopolies and monopsonies, guilds excluded entrants, 
restricted trade volumes, set output prices above the competitive level, fixed input 
costs below the competitive level, and imposed costs on competitors (La Force 1965; 
Walker 1971; Clark and Slack 1976; Coleman 1977; Ogilvie 2004a; Ogilvie 2005; 
Lindberg 2008; Lindberg 2009; Boldorf 2009; Ogilvie 2011; Caracausi 2015). 
Some of a guild’s exclusive entitlements were laid down explicitly, 
usually in a charter or ordinance issued by the town or state government. But guilds 
often enforced privileges that were not embodied in any legislation but were simply 
“well-known” to be part of their entitlements (Walker 1971; Ogilvie 2004a; Ehmer 
2008; Ogilvie 2011). This led to constant demarcation conflicts—between guilds 
governing adjacent trades, merchant guilds and craft guilds, guilds of different towns, 
or guilds and non-guilded outsiders (Rosenband 1997; Ogilvie 1997; Trivellato 2006; 
Hafter 2007; Van den Heuvel 2007; Lindberg 2008; Ogilvie 2011; Caracausi 2015).  
Guild monopolies were shielded in a variety of ways. Some limits on 
competition arose from geographic factors such as high transportation costs, raw 
material endowments, urban agglomeration economies, or limits on migration 
(Ogilvie 1997; Ogilvie 2011). Others came from political protection. Guilds often 
secured government barriers to trade, as when the Venetian state blocked imports of 
French mirrors to protect the Murano glassblowers’ guild (Trivellato 2006) or the 
governments of most European states blocked imports of cheap ribbons from the 
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Netherlands or Basel produced on the forbidden innovation of the multi-shuttle ribbon 
frame (Davids 2008; Pfister 2008). Guilds also obtained direct enforcement of their 
privileges from municipal and state governments (La Force 1965; Bossenga 1988; 
Rosenband 1997; Ogilvie 1997; Wiesner 2000; Ogilvie 2003; Trivellato 2006; Horn 
2006; Hafter 2007). Archival records are replete with cases of guild members 
penalized by the public authorities for producing above their guild quota, using 
prohibited techniques, or employing women. In 1669, for instance, when the weaver 
Hannss Schrotter broke his guild’s rules by employing a female servant to weave, his 
town court fined him the equivalent of a maidservant’s average annual wage (Ogilvie 
2003). Public law-courts also punished black-market producers for illegally infringing 
on guild monopolies, as in 1711 when the Württemberg state responded to complaints 
by the retailers’ guild against a converted Jew’s widow by closing down her village 
shop, or in 1742 when a town court jailed a villager’s wife after a complaint by the 
local nailsmith that she was “dealing in foreign nails, which violated the nailsmiths’ 
guild ordinance, and damaged him in his craft” (Ogilvie 2003). Governments also 
supported guilds in regulating labor markets, as in 1781, when the pinmakers’ guild of 
a Normandy town fined a journeyman five years’ wages for quitting his job counter to 
guild regulations, and the municipal authorities supported the guild on the grounds 
that “if workers could leave their masters when they please, insubordination and 
anarchy will result, and ruin manufacturing” (Horn 2006, p. 45). The authorities also 
punished consumers who purchased wares from non-guilded craftsmen, as in 
Bohemia when the count of Friedland’s court responded to complaints by the local 
tailors’ guild in 1662 by fining three villagers for buying cheap garments from non-
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guilded interlopers, by which they had “premeditatedly tried to deceive the authorities 
and the court, and sought their own advantage.”2 
Guilds could seldom defend their monopolies perfectly, which has led to 
occasional claims that guilds’ privileges had no real economic effects (Epstein 1998; 
Epstein 2008; Epstein and Prak 2008; Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994; Greif 
2006). Guild regulations were certainly violated both by free-riding insiders and 
cartel-breaking outsiders, creating a black-market informal sector. But this did not 
mean that the guild had no economic effects, just that these effects consisted partly of 
excluding competitors altogether and partly of pushing them into the black market. 
Even where a particular guild’s monopoly was not perfectly enforced, it affected the 
economy by creating an informal sector of illegal trade where costs and risks were 
higher because of the threat of persecution (De Soto 1989; Boldorf 2009; Ogilvie 
2011).  
Although not all guilds have been investigated in detail, where documents 
survive they show that people at the time were willing to pay money to obtain, defend, 
attack, circumvent, or sub-contract into guild privileges, suggesting strongly that those 
privileges were enforced sufficiently to have a real economic impact (Kisch 1989; 
Rosenband 1997; Wiesner 2000; Ogilvie 2005; Horn 2006; Boldorf 2009; Lindberg 
2009; Ogilvie 2011; Caracausi 2015). Applicants paid high fees to get into guilds: the 
sixteenth-century Parisian grocers’ guild charged a journeyman the equivalent of 
about 9 years’ wages for mastership (Larmour 1967); the eighteenth-century Parisian 
furriers’ guild charged even a master’s son (who paid the lowest fees) the equivalent 
of over 9 years’ wages (Kaplan 1981). Outsiders spent large sums circumventing 
guild monopolies or sub-contracting into them, as in 1706 when illegal wigmakers 
                                                     
2 Státní Oblastní Archiv Litomĕřice, Pobočka Dĕčín, Fond Rodinný archiv Clam-Gallasů, Historická 
sbírka, Kart. 80, fol. 59, 1 August 1662. 
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were bribing Paris guild officials with sums equivalent to 1-2 years’ journeyman’s 
wages to let them practise without a license (Gayne 2004). Guilds themselves engaged 
in costly political lobbying and inter-guild conflicts to obtain, defend, and extend their 
privileges: one German weavers’ guild spent a sum equivalent to 115 days’ earnings 
for a guild master on lobbying and external conflicts, every year between 1598 and 
1760 (Ogilvie 1997). The willingness of so many contemporaries to spend resources 
attacking, defending, or gaining access to guild privileges suggests that those 
privileges exercised real economic effects (Ogilvie 1997; Ogilvie 2011; Boldorf 2009; 
Lindberg 2009; Caracausi 2015).  
The documentary record provides only occasional snapshots of the direct 
effect of guilds on markets. But for the times and places where figures survive, they 
indicate that guild monopolies exerted real effects. When the German Hansa obtained 
exclusive rights over the Swedish Skåne fairs after 1370, participation by English and 
Dutch merchants declined, the fairs contracted, and the range of goods narrowed 
(Ogilvie 2011). After 1440, when the Norwegian crown began to reduce the privileges 
of the German Hansa in Bergen, there was an influx of merchants from Holland and 
the Norwegian trade expanded (Wubs-Mrozewicz 2005). In 1650, when the 
Württemberg state granted the guild-like “company” of the Calw merchant-dyers a 
monopoly over finishing and exporting worsted textiles, participation by weavers, 
women, and rural traders declined and the industry contracted (Ogilvie 1997). In the 
1750s, when some Dutch town governments compelled guilds to lower their entry 
barriers, crafts and trades saw a huge influx of poorer entrants, especially women 
(Van den Heuvel 2007). In the 1760s, when the woollen-weavers’ guilds of the 
Bohemian town of Brno lost their power to regulate entry and technology, the 
industry immediately took off (Freudenberger 1960). In 1778, when the Spanish 
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consulados lost their monopoly, legal trade expanded hugely in Central America, the 
Río de la Plata, Chile, Cuba, and Venezuela (Woodward 2007). In 1791, when France 
abolished its guilds in the wake of the Revolution, tens of thousands of women and 
men applied for permission to practice previously guilded occupations (Fitzsimmons 
2010). In the early nineteenth century, when the German city of Aachen abolished 
guilds, the textile industry expanded in the countryside and factories sprang up in 
neighboring Burtscheid and Monschau (Kisch 1989). 
The history of guilds shows that occupational licensing, with its far-
reaching effects, is not a modern phenomenon. Professional organizations enforcing 
barriers to entry were the default in all but the poorest occupations before the 
Industrial Revolution; what is new in modern economies is the existence of so many 
occupations where no license is required. Guilds demonstrate how occupational 
licensing, even when imperfectly enforced, has real economic effects, if only by 
pushing economic activity into the informal sector where growth is often stifled by 
insecure property rights, poor contract enforcement, high risks, short time horizons, 
information scarcity, consumer fraud, and labor exploitation (De Soto 1989; 
Trivellato 2006; Ogilvie 2007b).  
 
Security and Contract Enforcement 
 Economic growth requires markets, and markets require supporting 
institutions that guarantee property rights and contract enforcement (Ogilvie and 
Carus 2014). Guilds, as closed social networks, might have been able to provide these 
guarantees by generating a social capital of trust and collective action. The historical 
evidence for Europe during the eight centuries before industrialization, however, 
indicates that property rights and contract enforcement were guaranteed primarily via 
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private business practices (written records, pledges, brokers, notaries, firms) 
supported by public-order institutions (legal systems, town administrations, royal 
governments). Private-order institutions such as guilds occasionally provided informal 
supplements to these mechanisms, typically on a particularized basis for their own 
members. But they did not substitute for public institutions in providing generalized 
property rights and contract enforcement to the economy more widely (Edwards and 
Ogilvie 2012; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). Indeed, in some cases the actions of guilds in 
pursuit of rents for their members tended to reduce the security of contracts for others 
in the economy (Katele 1988; Tai 1996; Lindberg 2009; Ogilvie 2011).  
For security of property rights, public-order institutions were far more 
important than private-order networks such as guilds. Very early in the medieval 
Commercial Revolution, rulers demonstrably had good security incentives. As the 
ruler of Champagne declared in 1148, he would not tolerate attacks on foreign 
merchants travelling to trade at the famous Champagne fairs, since this “tends to 
nothing less than the ruin of my fairs” (Edwards and Ogilvie 2012, p. 132) He and his 
successors backed up these security guarantees with highway police, diplomatic 
penalties, and military force, which provided generalized protection to “all merchants, 
merchandise, and all manner of persons coming to the fair,” thereby creating the most 
important long-distance trading centres in western Europe (Edwards and Ogilvie 
2012, p. 136). The most successful medieval and early modern trading locations—the 
Champagne fairs, Venice, Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London—were ones where 
the political authorities made such generalized security guarantees to all merchants, 
rather than issuing particularized safe-conducts as privileges to members of favored 
guilds (Ogilvie 2011; Edwards and Ogilvie 2012; Gelderblom 2013). 
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Guilds sometimes took on tasks that related to providing public order, 
such as security, contract enforcement, and even military action. This has sometimes 
been interpreted as guilds effectively replacing the state in the provision of such goods 
(Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994; Greif 2006). However, when the specific actions 
of guilds are examined and put in context, the lesson is that guilds only supplemented 
institutions of public order to a modest extent, only for their own members, and only 
when it suited the interests of the guild to do so (Ogilvie 2011).  
As one example, craft guilds were occasionally used by town governments 
to organize municipal militias (Hickson and Thomson 1991). But guilds were neither 
necessary nor sufficient for such militias, and the majority of medieval and early 
modern towns and territories organized defence without directly involving guilds 
(Ogilvie 2011). Guilds of long-distance merchants also sometimes organized convoys, 
caravans or fortifications in foreign trading locations (Volckart and Mangels 1999). 
But again, these club goods provided by guilds appear to have been an occasional 
convenience rather than a universal necessity, since in the same economies and time-
periods convoys, caravans and fortifications were organized by individual merchants, 
merchant firms, town governments, and princes (Ogilvie 2011).  
Merchant guilds also sometimes put pressure on foreign rulers to grant 
security guarantees (Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 2004). But guilds also lobbied 
foreign rulers for all sorts of other favors, including guaranteeing their monopolies 
and discriminating against competitors (Ogilvie 2011). Merchants who were not 
members of guilds also easily got security guarantees from rulers; indeed, guilded 
merchants often sought supplementary security guarantees as individuals, rather than 
as guild members (Harreld 2004; Ogilvie 2011). In all these cases, the actual security 
itself—whether guaranteed to individuals, to guilds, or to the entire economy—was 
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provided by the public authorities (Ogilvie 2011; Gelderblom 2013). Furthermore, the 
security guarantees rulers granted to guilds were particularized: they applied only to 
members of the guild that obtained them, typically in return for payments and favors 
to the ruler, and thus did not create generalized security to support economic growth 
more widely (Ogilvie 2011; Ogilvie and Carus 2014).  
Contract enforcement is another sphere in which guilds were sometimes 
active. Some guilds operated internal courts which decided conflicts among members, 
and this has inspired claims that guilds offered a private-order alternative to 
inadequate or non-existent public legal systems (Greif 2006). But many guilds had no 
internal courts, those that existed operated under devolved authority from town or 
state governments, guild tribunals usually referred complicated conflicts to public 
courts, and guilded merchants often voted with their feet by taking contracts before 
public jurisdictions—even when their guilds forbade it (Harreld 2004; Sachs 2006; 
Woodward 2007; Ogilvie 2011; Gelderblom 2013). 
Guilds also sometimes provided contract enforcement via a “community 
responsibility system”, whereby if a member of one guild defaulted on a contract with 
a member of another, the injured party’s guild would impose collective reprisals on all 
members of the defaulter’s guild, giving the latter an incentive to penalize the 
defaulter (Greif 2006). Collective inter-guild “reprisals” (as contemporaries called 
them) certainly occurred in medieval Europe. But such action greatly increased 
trading risks for all, including innocent third parties. Businessmen and governments 
therefore disliked them intensely and viewed them as a last resort. From the very 
beginning of the medieval Commercial Revolution, European trading centres sought 
to limit reprisals by embedding them in the public legal system (Boerner and Ritschl 
2002; Edwards and Ogilvie 2012). Merchants often demanded that rulers outlaw 
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reprisals as a condition of trading in their territories, as the Scandinavian and German 
merchants demanded from Russian rulers in 1191 or the Flemish rulers demanded 
from the King of France in 1193 (Ogilvie 2011).  
Finally, to secure rents for their members, guilds also engaged in other 
activities which incidentally—or sometimes deliberately—reduced security of 
property rights and contracts. Merchant guilds attacked the trade of rival merchants 
directly or lobbied their governments to do so in order to protect their own 
monopolies and other privileges (Katele 1988; Tai 1996). In 1162, for instance, a 
thousand members of the Pisan merchant guild in Constantinople attacked the three-
hundred-strong Genoese merchant guild with the intention, according to a 
contemporary account, of “despoiling and killing them” (Ogilvie 2011, p. 226). This 
led to a two-day battle, the looting of 30,000 bezants’ worth of merchandise, the 
bankruptcy of a major Genoese firm, and at least one fatality. Such attacks reduced 
security not only for guilds’ competitors, but also for uninvolved third parties caught 
in the crossfire. The economic impact of guilds’ security activities is therefore 
questionable. Guilds of merchants often (though not always) increased security for 
their members, but they also often decreased security for outsiders.  
Overall, the empirical findings suggest that impersonal exchange in 
medieval and early modern Europe was sustained not by particularized arrangements 
such as guild jurisdictions or inter-guild reprisals, but by generalized institutions: 
private business practices backed up by public-order municipal or state institutions, 
which were open to all traders, not just members of privileged guilds. 
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Information Asymmetries and Quality Standards  
Information asymmetries between producers and consumers about the 
quality of goods raises the possibility of a market failure which could be solved 
through standards set by a producer organization such as a guild. However, the 
problem of “quality” under asymmetric information is solved not by having producers 
fix a specific standard, but rather by providing consumers with reliable information 
about quality, so they can choose the quality-price combination they prefer (Ogilvie 
2004a; Ogilvie 2007a; Ogilvie 2008).  
Guilds of craftsmen often regulated raw materials, production processes, 
training, and output characteristics, which has inspired some to argue that guilds 
offered an efficient solution to market failures concerning product quality (Gustafsson 
1987; Richardson 2004). Indeed, a monopolistic organization such as a guild might be 
better able than a range of competing producers to guarantee a single, standard 
quality. But those same characteristics typically made a guild less able and willing to 
undertake the flexible response to changes in demand necessary to deliver the 
combinations of quality and price desired by a varied and changing population of 
customers (Ogilvie 2004a; Boldorf 2009; Caracausi 2015). This was recognized by 
contemporaries such as the French economist and industrial inspector Simon 
Clicquot-Blervache who in 1758 ruefully contrasted stagnant French industries with 
vibrant foreign (especially English) competitors, observing that “although it is useful 
to make perfect things, it is no less advantageous to make mediocre things, or even 
bad things, providing that the low price invites and brings about consumption.... Our 
regulations and our guilds fix merchandise at the same quality level and the same 
form, and elevate our merchandise to a value that is too high to compete” (Minard 
2000, p. 486). 
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Moreover, guild guarantees of quality were often weak because guilds 
existed not primarily to constrain or penalize their members, but rather to secure and 
defend those members’ rents. As a result, guilds typically penalized their members’ 
quality violations too mildly to deter them (Homer 2002; Forbes 2002; Ogilvie 2005). 
Customers often described guild quality controls as inadequate, and wholesale 
merchants added their own quality inspections at point of purchase. As one German 
guild inspector declared in 1660, “the cloth-sealing takes place very badly, and when 
one says anything about it, one incurs great enmity” (Ogilvie 2004a, p. 295). Guild 
inspectors lacked the incentive to develop the skills and deploy the effort necessary to 
detect low-quality work beyond superficial features (such as size) which were readily 
apparent to wholesale merchants and consumers anyway (Ogilvie 2005; Boldorf 
2009).  
Guild actions to secure rents for their members could also inflict 
unintended harm on the quality of guild output. Guilds often set price ceilings for raw 
materials, so suppliers would sometimes seek to earn profits by lowering quality 
(Ogilvie 1997). Guilds imposed piece-rate ceilings on sub-contractors (such as 
spinners), depriving them of incentives to work more carefully (Ogilvie 2003; Boldorf 
2009). Guilds sometimes enforced collective inter-guild “monopoly contracting,” 
outlawing sales and purchases by individual craftsmen and merchants. This created a 
rigid regime of collective prices and quotas that removed individual craftsmen’s 
incentives to do better work and individual merchants’ incentives to experiment with 
new quality-price ratios that might better suit consumer demand (Ogilvie 2004a; 
Boldorf 2009). To defend their monopoly prices, guilds used their quality regulations 
to prevent their own members from producing the quality levels that some consumers 
actually demanded. In 1661, for instance, one German guild justified refusing to seal 
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one of its member’s cloths on the grounds that “Old Jacob Zeyher makes absolutely 
terrible cloths, but sells them very cheap and thereby causes the guild great injury,” to 
which Zeyher replied that he “sells such cloth in Offenburg, the people want it like 
that from him; but the guild sealers will not seal it for him” (Ogilvie 2004a, pp. 296-
7).  
Comparisons across countries show that many strongly guilded industries 
produced goods and services of a quality—measured in terms of what consumers 
wanted—that compared poorly with similar industries where guilds were weak or 
absent. From the fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century, for instance, the Flemish 
rural industrial agglomeration of Hondschoote grew rapidly, exported its textiles to 
satisfied customers all over Europe, and out-competed the Flemish urban textile 
guilds—all without guild quality regulations. In the eighteenth century, the West 
Riding of Yorkshire developed the most successful worsted industry in Europe by 
producing “cheap and nasty” cloths subject to no quality controls by guilds, but also 
no price controls; instead, quality was monitored by merchants and customers at the 
point of purchase (Heaton 1965). Unguilded industries did not merely produce 
attractive-but-cheap goods, but also fine products well-known for their high quality, 
as in the case of the all-female Venetian lace-making industry, the Franconian wire-
drawing industry, or the north Bohemian fine linen industry (Ogilvie 2005). In many 
successful European industries, quality control was solved through alternative 
institutions—merchant, town, or state inspections—that provided information about 
quality to potential purchasers without the rigidities imposed by guilds (Heaton 1965; 
Ogilvie 2004a; Boldorf 2009; Caracausi 2015).  
Guilds were certainly often active in regulating quality. But there is little 
empirical support for the idea that they were efficient institutions for solving 
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information asymmetries between producers and consumers. Their other incentives, 
particularly the desire to generate rents for their members, interfered with their ability 
to guarantee the appropriate standards: the variation in quality level desired by 
consumers, not producers (Ogilvie 2004a; Caracausi 2015). 
 
Human Capital Investment 
Guilds are often seen as synonymous with human capital investment, since 
many of them operated training systems. Any institution that fosters skills is 
interesting, since modern theories of economic growth postulate that investing in 
human capital makes people work more productively, invent better techniques, and 
substitute quality for quantity of offspring. 
Guilds of merchants and retailers seldom regulated training, even though 
commerce demanded literacy, numeracy, and geographical and linguistic skills (Van 
den Heuvel 2007; Ogilvie 2011). Guilds of craftsmen, however, did often operate 
mandatory training programs. Most required “apprenticeship,” a minimum number of 
years of unpaid (or low-paid) on-the-job training with a guild master. After that, many 
guilds also mandated “journeymanship,” a minimum number of years of day-laboring 
for guild masters, usually at capped wages, often involving compulsory “wandering” 
from town to town. Guilds often required an apprentice or journeyman to pass an 
examination or produce a “masterpiece,” a piece of work used to judge his fitness to 
become a “master.” Only masters, who had obtained the full guild license, were 
permitted to practise a guilded occupation independently. 
While craft guilds often made apprenticeship and journeymanship 
compulsory—at least on paper—the extent of actual training sheds bleak light on the 
incentives of monopolistic professional associations with regard to human capital 
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investment. Contemporaries often complained that guilds failed to penalize neglectful 
masters of apprentices, issued certificates to apprentices without examination, or 
granted mastership without training or examination to masters’ relatives and well-off 
youths who paid for “privileges” (La Force 1965; Kaplan 1981; Horn 2006). A 
Thuringian merchant explained in 1681 that he preferred to buy textiles from non-
guilded rural producers because among the guilded urban weavers, “masters’ sons 
hardly ever went travelling [as journeymen], were not required to demonstrate their 
knowledge through any masterpiece, and hence did not know how to do anything” 
(Ogilvie 2004a, p. 312). In the mid-eighteenth century, the Paris goldsmiths’ guild 
admitted one-quarter of its new masters via special “privileges,” one-third as non-
apprenticed masters’ sons, and less than half by proper apprenticeship (Kaplan 1981). 
The Rouen ribbon-makers’ guild admitted one-third of its masters via “privileges,” 
over one-half as non-apprenticed masters’ sons, and less than one-tenth after guild 
apprenticeship (Hafter 2007). Situations such as these were widespread because 
guilds, as associations of masters, had an incentive to certify the relatives of members 
regardless of skill and to reap rents by selling admission to untrained entrants who 
could afford to pay for privileges (Kaplan 1981; Ogilvie 2007a; Hafter 2007).  
Cross-country comparisons also cast doubt on whether guilds were useful 
institutions for ensuring appropriate levels of human capital investment. Many 
occupations were guilded in some pre-modern European societies and unguilded in 
others. Linen weaving, worsted weaving, cotton production, scythe making, ribbon 
making, knitting, lace making, and the making of small iron goods, were guilded in 
many regions of Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Bohemia, Serbia, Bulgaria and 
Greece, but unguilded in many parts of England, the Low Countries, Scotland, 
Switzerland, and Ireland (Ogilvie 1997; Ogilvie 2004a; Ogilvie 2007a). What decided 
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whether an activity would be guilded was not its skill requirements, but whether a 
group of practitioners was politically able to secure and maintain guild privileges over 
that activity. In many European crafts, apprenticeships were entered into as private 
agreements between trainees and masters which were enforced like other contracts 
without the need for guild regulations (Davids 2003; Ogilvie 2007a; Wallis 2008; 
Caracausi 2015). In many other crafts, formal apprenticeships were irrelevant. Black-
market “interlopers” who failed to obtain guild training—often, as in the case of 
women and Jews, because guilds excluded them—were vigorously opposed by guilds 
precisely because they had skills indistinguishable from those of guild members and 
were willingly hired by customers (Wiesner 2000; Ogilvie 2003; Ogilvie 2007a; 
Hafter 2007; Van den Heuvel 2007). For some pre-modern occupations, skilled 
training was clearly required, and in some, formal apprenticeship was the best method 
to provide it. But comparisons across pre-modern Europe suggest that guilds were 
neither necessary nor sufficient for ensuring that people invested in their own human 
capital. 
Guilds did not just administer a training system which was open to all 
capable applicants. Instead, to secure rents for their members, guilds decided who was 
allowed to get training, and kept most people out. As one German jurist put it in 1780, 
“Anyone who wants to learn a craft has to possess particular qualities, which are 
necessary because without them no-one can be accepted as an apprentice and enrolled 
in a guild. Among these qualities are included ... masculine sex, since no female may 
properly practise a craft, even if she understands it just as well as a male person” 
(Ogilvie 2003, p. 97). Guilds denied apprenticeship not just to females, but to many 
males—Jews, bastards, gypsies, former serfs and slaves; most members of other 
religions, ethnicities, and nationalities; those without the right parentage in the guild 
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or community; those with an ancestor who had practised a “defiling” occupation; and 
anyone who couldn’t afford the entrance fees (Walker 1971; Wiesner 2000; Horn 
2006; Ogilvie 2007a).  
It might be argued that sexist, anti-Semitic, and racist cultural norms were 
universal in pre-modern societies, so guild barriers against women, Jews and minority 
ethnic groups did not matter (e.g. by Epstein 2008; Epstein and Prak 2008). But 
cultural norms could only exert economic impact via institutions, such as guilds, that 
penalized those who deviated from the norms, for instance by admitting women or 
Jews to training. In markets where guilds were weak or absent, the individual self-
interest of trainers, employers and consumers made the enforcement of cultural norms 
much less effective (Ogilvie 2003; Trivellato 2006).3 
Craft guilds are sometimes portrayed as institutions that corrected failures 
in markets for human capital that made it difficult for individuals to choose the right 
training, for good trainers and good trainees to identify one another, and for 
consumers to identify well-trained producers (Epstein 1998; Pfister 1998; Epstein and 
Prak 2008). Did guilds ensure higher, or more economically relevant, levels of human 
capital investment for the small numbers of insider males whom they admitted than 
those individuals would have obtained otherwise? The deficiencies in guild training 
discussed above, the high drop-out rates among guild apprentices, the eagerness with 
which consumers bought goods and services from non-guild-trained “interlopers”, and 
                                                     
3 A 2007 estimate suggests that restrictions on women’s access to education and 
training costs modern Asian economies $16-$30 billion a year, and that increasing 
female education and training by 1 percentage point would increase GDP growth by 
0.2 percentage points (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific 2007, pp. 105-6). Such findings for modern developing economies suggest 
that when guilds in pre-industrial Europe restricted the access of women to training, 
they inflicted wider economic damage (Ogilvie 2003). 
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the success of so many non-guilded industries suggests that in many cases the answer 
was “no” (Heaton 1965; Rappaport 1989; Ogilvie 2007a; Wallis 2008). 
 
Technological Innovation  
How did guilds affect technological innovation? The most visible way in 
which guilds interacted with new techniques was when, as often happened, they 
opposed them. Many guild members thought there was a limited lump of labor to go 
around. Innovations that squeezed more output from existing inputs would flood 
markets, depress prices, and put guild masters out of work. As one fourteenth-century 
Catalan intellectual put it, “If a shoemaker comes along with new tools and makes 70 
shoes in a day where others make 20 … that would be the ruin of 100 or 200 
shoemakers” (Casey 1999, p. 65). Guilds therefore often opposed innovations that 
seemed to threaten their rents in this zero-sum world. They lobbied against new 
devices and products, forbade their members to adopt new processes, blocked imports 
embodying new ideas, and boycotted wares and workers from places that used 
forbidden techniques (La Force 1965; Amelang 1986; Ogilvie 2004a; Davids 2008).  
On the other hand, guilds did not always oppose innovation, and a number 
of new techniques were invented by guild masters or adopted within guilds (Epstein 
1998; Epstein and Prak 2008). To some extent, this was inevitable because such a 
large percentage of specialized industrial producers were organized into guilds 
(Ogilvie 2007a; Ogilvie 2008). However, one can also propose theoretical models in 
which guilds provided institutional mechanisms to support invention and diffusion of 
new technology. For example, by providing monopoly rents in output markets, guilds 
might have allowed innovators to capture a portion of the gains from innovation. By 
monopolizing the labor market in a particular occupation, guilds might help to ensure 
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transmission of techniques across generations (via compulsory years of 
apprenticeship) and across space (via compulsory travelling by journeymen). By 
promoting spatial clustering of craftsmen in towns, guilds might facilitate technology 
transfer among masters (Epstein 1998; Epstein and Prak 2008).  
Of course, the fundamental issue is what institutional arrangements best 
address the potential for market failure posed by the fact that technological 
information is a public good. While the theoretical models of how guilds might foster 
innovation doubtless capture part of the truth, almost any market structure can be 
shown to have superior innovative qualities, depending on the choice of assumptions 
(Scherer and Ross 1990). Moreover, the assumptions in these models often do not fit 
the facts on the ground. Guilds, as we have seen, enjoyed legal monopolies with 
strong barriers to entry. Very high levels of industrial concentration, such as those 
fostered by guilds, rarely show any positive effect on technological progress, more 
often tending to impede it by limiting the number of independent sources of 
innovation, reducing incentives to improve market position by devising new 
techniques, and blocking entry by venturesome upstarts (Scherer and Ross 1990; 
Ogilvie 2004a).  
Nor did the diffusion of technical information require guilds. As discussed 
above, outsiders who had been denied guild training managed to learn the relevant 
technical expertise without it, masters’ widows who never had any formal guild 
training practised the techniques legally, and many successful European industries 
transmitted their techniques across generations without relying on guilds (Ogilvie 
2004a; Hafter 2007; Davids 2008; Caracausi 2015). Communicating innovations 
geographically did not require guild journeymanship: some of the most innovative 
industrial societies in pre-modern Europe (such as the Low Countries and England) 
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did not require journeymen to travel, while some of the most backward (such as the 
German and Austrian territories) did (Ogilvie 2007a; Davids 2008). In any case, pre-
modern workers were highly mobile even in unguilded occupations such as 
agriculture and laboring (Lucassen and Lucassen 1997; Ogilvie 2003). Horizontal 
transmission of technical expertise may have benefited from spatial clustering, but for 
this guilds were neither necessary nor sufficient. After all, industrial agglomeration is 
widely observed in many guild-free economies, including modern ones, because of its 
recognized economic advantages (Marshall 1920; Ogilvie 2007a; Ogilvie 2008). 
Guild actions to secure rents for their members also had unintended, but 
negative, consequences for innovation. Guilds regulated production processes in detail 
as part of their overall goals of monitoring unlicensed production. But stipulating 
precisely how a product was supposed to be made also deterred innovation by 
ossifying production methods and excluding even desirable deviations (Daumas 1953; 
Trivellato 2006; Caracausi 2015). Guilds fixed minimum prices to protect their 
members from low-cost competitors, but this also deterred innovators by forbidding 
them to profit by finding ways to charge less than competitors (Ogilvie 2004a; Ogilvie 
2007a). Guilds restricted admissions and prohibited mobility to exclude entrants, but 
these regulations also deterred innovation, because migration of practitioners 
embodying innovative industrial and commercial practices was the most common 
form of technological transfer in pre-modern societies (De Vries 1976; Amelang 
1986; Boldorf 2009; Caracausi 2015). Guilds justified their entry barriers partly by 
their apprenticeship and journeymanship regulations which obliged practitioners to 
spend many years investing in learning a particular set of techniques; but this 
endowed masters with a heavy investment in human capital specific to that 
technology, creating incentives to resist any technical change that threatened the value 
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of masters’ investment (Daumas 1953; Ogilvie 2007a; Mokyr 2009). Guilds imposed 
demarcations between different crafts to protect their members’ monopoly rents, but 
this deterred innovation by preventing the productive exchange of ideas between 
adjacent bodies of knowledge (Rosenband 1997; Ogilvie 2004a; Fitzsimmons 2010). 
The eighteenth-century English precision-instrument industry, for instance, was the 
most advanced in Europe partly because the London “livery companies” of the 
clockmakers and spectacle-makers no longer regulated entry or production practices, 
facilitating an influx of venturesome newcomers and innovative methods from 
adjacent occupations; in France, by contrast, the industry was stifled by guild 
regulations fixing occupational demarcations, workshop size, employee numbers, 
division of labor, output quotas, prices, and selling practices, which even royal and 
seigneurial protection could only partly counteract (Daumas 1953).  
Comparisons within and between European societies suggest that, 
although guilds sometimes permitted or even pioneered new practices and products, 
their net effect on technological innovation was negative. In Normandy, one of the 
most highly industrialized French provinces, guild obstacles to new techniques and 
practices meant that by 1782, 85 percent of cotton manufacturing and the entirety of 
the woollen, stocking, metallurgical, paper, glass, chemical and ceramics industries 
were sheltered in small, scattered guild-free enclaves (Horn 2012). Within the 
Netherlands, Leiden distinguished itself from other cities by limiting or altogether 
banning textile guilds, yet its flourishing industries were at the forefront of 
technological innovation, introducing hundreds of new fabrics and a vast array of 
innovative methods and devices between 1580 and 1797 (Ogilvie 2007a; Davids 
2008; Lis and Soly 2008). Within England, the mechanical innovations of the 
Industrial Revolution were introduced not in the guilded “borough” towns but in fast-
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growing centres such as Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield, and 
Wolverhampton, which had no guilds (Clark and Slack 1976; Coleman 1977; Pollard 
1997). Across German-speaking central Europe, English textile machinery was 
introduced first in the Rhineland where territorial fragmentation enabled local 
entrepreneurs to evade guild opposition by securing factory permits from neighboring 
states; and in Saxony, where rulers had systematically weakened guild institutions 
since the sixteenth century (Kisch 1989; Tipton 1976). Territories such as Austria, 
Württemberg, Bavaria, and Silesia, by contrast, retained powerful guilds of merchants 
and craftsmen which used government protection to block innovations in the hope of 
protecting their members’ rents long into the nineteenth century (Freudenberger 1960; 
Tipton 1976; Ogilvie 1996a; Boldorf 2009).  
Across Europe, as we have seen, the same industry could be strongly 
guilded in some societies, weakly guilded in others, and wholly unguilded in still 
others. There is no evidence that technological innovation was greater in the strongly 
guilded ones. On the contrary: in many cases unguilded or weakly guilded industries 
were at the forefront of inventing, adopting, and diffusing new techniques. Evidence 
on the level of both political regions and specific industries thus indicates that the net 
effect of guilds was to intensify, rather than to correct, imperfections in markets 
relating to innovations—not just markets for ideas, but the factor and product markets 
necessary for putting new ideas to work in practical business settings (Ogilvie 2000).  
 
What Do Guilds Tell Us About Institutions and Growth? 
 
Some models of markets and economic growth point out the importance of 
institutions that generate trust and “social capital.” The empirical findings on 
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European guilds suggest that trust and social capital take two distinct forms, which 
play fundamentally different roles in economic performance (Ogilvie 2005). A guild 
typically generated a particularized trust among its own members, as insiders in the 
closed and multiplex social network of that guild. But broader economic growth 
requires a generalized trust that makes people willing to transact on an equal footing 
with everyone, even strangers (Ogilvie 2011; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). There is no 
evidence that a particularized trust in people who were members of the same guild 
encouraged a generalized trust across the wider economy. On the contrary, as we have 
seen, the particularized social capital of guilds gave rise to rent-seeking, demarcation 
struggles, and hostility towards outsiders, diminishing rather than fostering the trust in 
strangers that might have made markets and states work better. Indeed, the history of 
European guilds suggests that the existence of entrenched social networks fostering a 
particularized trust among members can block the rise of more productive institutional 
arrangements such as impersonal markets and impartial states that enable gains from 
trade among people who are dissimilar and do not already know one another (Ogilvie 
2005; Ogilvie 2011; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). 
Even more fundamentally, guilds hold lessons for explaining the 
emergence, survival and decline of economic institutions themselves. Guilds existed 
in a vast range of geographically variegated locations, European and non-European, 
from the Arctic Circle to the equator, from huge maritime cities such as Venice and 
Istanbul to tiny landlocked villages in the Black Forest or northern Bohemia. These 
included societies of widely differing languages, religions, and value systems, from 
the Roman Empire to Egypt, India, China, Japan, Persia, Turkey, Europe, and Central 
and South America. This range strongly suggests that the formation of guilds is not an 
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outcome of accident, geography, cultural beliefs, population density, or the technical 
requirements of particular occupations.  
Instead, the historical findings on guilds provide strong support for 
explanations according to which institutions arise and survive for centuries not mainly 
because they address market failures, but because they serve the distributional 
interests of powerful groups (Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson 2005; Ogilvie and 
Carus 2014). Guilds illustrate the long historical interdependence between economic 
and political institutions in regulating markets. Guilds could sustain their members’ 
collective monopoly against internal free-riding and external competition only by 
getting support from political authorities in exchange for a share of the rents. Pre-
modern urban and royal governments drew on multiple sources of taxes, loans, and 
political support. But special-interest groups such as guilds offered highly attractive 
bribes, gifts, loans, fiscal services, and regulatory collaboration that enabled rulers and 
their officials to obtain funds in advance of tax receipts, to induce merchants and 
craftsmen to reveal information about business conditions through their bids for 
privileges, to put pressure on businessmen to make higher loans than would otherwise 
have been forthcoming, to benefit from businessmen’s knowledge and expertise in 
collecting industrial and commercial taxes, and to mobilize political support from the 
bourgeoisie (Ogilvie 2011; Rapp 1976; Bourgeon 1985; Hafter 1989; Lindberg 2009; 
Caracausi 2015). Guilds were institutions whose total costs were large, but were 
spread over a large number of people—potential entrants, employees, consumers—
who faced high transaction costs in resisting a politically entrenched institution. The 
total benefits of guilds, by contrast, were small, but were concentrated within a small 
group—guild members, political elites—who faced low costs of organizing alliances 
to keep them in being. Guilds survived for so long in so many places because of this 
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logic of collective action (Ogilvie 2004a). As the Minister of Finance Anne-Robert-
Jacques Turgot wrote to the King on the eve of his unsuccessful attempt to abolish the 
French guilds in 1776, “Many people have great interest in retaining the guilds, both 
the heads of the guilds themselves and those who benefit along with them, for the 
conflicts to which the guild system gives rise are one of the most abundant sources of 
profits for the people of the Palace” (Schelle 1913-23, vol. 5, p. 159). 
So why did guilds ever disappear? Even in the medieval and early modern 
heyday of guilds, there were enclaves—the Champagne fair towns, Douai, 
Hondschoote, Nürnberg, Leiden, the Zaanstreek, Krefeld, Normandy, Birmingham, 
Manchester—where businessmen and governments primarily used generalized rather 
than particularized institutions (Edwards and Ogilvie 2012; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). 
The period after c. 1500 saw a widening divergence across Europe in the relationship 
between governments and guilds. In societies such as the Low Countries and England, 
the political authorities gradually ceased to grant and enforce guilds’ privileges, while 
in “corporatist-absolutist” European states, such as France, Spain, Austria, 
Scandinavia, and the German and Italian territories, political elites continued to profit 
from their particularistic bargain with guilds for much longer (Ogilvie 2000; Ogilvie 
2011).  
The reasons for the gradual breakdown of the coalition between guilds and 
governments in some parts of western Europe are still a matter of lively debate. But 
current scholarship suggests a complex of factors that created a new equilibrium in 
which both the political authorities and the owners of industrial and commercial 
businesses gradually discovered they could do better for themselves by departing from 
the particularist path and beginning to use more generalized institutional mechanisms. 
These factors included stronger representative institutions (parliaments) that 
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increasingly constrained how rulers could raise revenues and grant privileges to 
special interest-groups; a more highly diversified urban system in which towns did not 
act in concert, but rather competed and limited each other’s ability to secure privileges 
from the public authorities; a more variegated social structure including prosperous, 
articulate and politically influential individuals who wanted to practise trade and 
industry and objected to its being monopolized by members of exclusive 
organizations; and governments that gradually made taxation more generalized and 
developed markets for public borrowing, reducing the attractiveness of short-term 
fiscal expedients such as selling privileges to special-interest groups (De Vries 1976; 
Lindberg 2008; Mokyr 2009; Ogilvie 2011; Gelderblom 2013; Ogilvie and Carus 
2014).  
In the “corporative-absolutist” societies of central, nordic, southern and 
eastern Europe, by contrast, the distributional coalition between guilds and 
governments only broke down through political conflict, always bitter and sometimes 
violent. France only abolished its guilds in 1791 after a national revolution, and then 
imposed this institutional reform as it conquered neighboring polities such as the 
Southern Netherlands (modern Belgium and Luxembourg), the Northern Netherlands, 
many Italian states, and parts of Germany (Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and 
Robinson 2011). But there were also many European societies—Austria, Hungary, 
Portugal, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, and numerous German states—that did 
not abolish guilds until the 1860s or even later, in most cases only after long and bitter 
socio-political conflict.  
The historical findings on guilds thus provide strong support for the view 
that institutions arise and survive for centuries not because they are efficient but 
because they serve the distributional interests of powerful groups.  
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